Part III
The fall of Srebrenica

... and an ‘ultimatum’, as well as the difference between ‘Close Air Support’ and ‘air strike’, was to play an important role on the following day.

The VRS reaction to the warning, according to General Nicolai, was exactly what UNPROFOR had become accustomed to – denial that the events had occurred. The VRS invariably reacted to all threats of Close Air Support with extraordinary agitation and the statement: ‘Threaten us with Close Air Support and terrible things will happen.’ In other words, that warning made a limited or no impression at all on the Bosnian Serbs, let alone that the VRS saw it as an ultimatum. At most, the warning had had a marginal influence on VRS tactics. In a military sense, Mladic was unquestionably extremely wily and undoubtedly realised that a concentration of heavy weaponry would set his units up as a clear target. According to Nicolai, Mladic was acutely aware of his vulnerability to an airborne attack. For that reason he avoided deploying his tanks on the blocking position and, instead, orchestrated an infantry attack.[1]

The idea was that Close Air Support was the ultimate deterrent and could therefore not be deployed too soon. No direct contact was established with either Mladic, Karadzic or Milosevic regarding the warning.[2] NATO Admiral Leighton Smith, who held the second key for Close Air Support, was not involved in drawing up the plans for the blocking positions.[3]

In short, in spite of reports to the contrary, there was never any question of a formal ultimatum with an associated sanction. According to Nicolai, General Smith had initially wanted to issue an ultimatum, but pressure from Zagreb had changed that. UNPROFOR could not afford to be manipulated into a situation similar to the events of 25 May 1995, which had led to the air strikes at Pale – that operation only yielded bad experiences. That was the reason for the conscious avoidance of the word ‘ultimatum’. An ultimatum, after all, had an irreversible character. Zagreb specifically wanted to leave itself room to manoeuvre to be able to determine the precise action at the supreme moment. Consequently, all it did was to issue a warning accompanied by a threat that, if necessary, Close Air Support would be used. The wording was carefully formulated and proposed to Zagreb. The text was edited a few times in an exchange of faxes between Zagreb and Sarajevo until a final text had been decided upon for approval by Janvier and Akashi. Zagreb had no further plans beyond the deployment of Close Air Support. In other words, there was never any question of air strikes.[4] Zagreb never gave thought to any actions beyond Close Air Support in the event of failure on the part of the VRS to heed the warnings. Certainly there were never any plans to follow up Close Air Support with an air strike. In other words, there was no Plan B to cover the consequences of a VRS dismissal of the warning.[5]

The Hague and the Blocking Positions

No substantive consultation occurred between Dutchbat and the Netherlands Army Crisis staff on 9 July concerning the blocking positions, nor was there consultation between Dutchbat and the Defence Crisis Management Centre. As UN Commander, Karremans did not need to consult those bodies. The Hague was also not authorised to amend the instructions on the use of force. Kolsteren, from Zagreb, notified the Defence Crisis Management Centre about the blocking positions, and Brantz, from Tuzla, notified the Netherlands Army Crisis staff.[6] By the end of the afternoon Nicolai communicated with Chief of Defence Staff Van den Breemen about the plan for the blocking positions. Nicolai thereby reported on his efforts to contact Mladic regarding the current operation. He had however only succeeded in speaking to VRS General Tolimir, who claimed to have no knowledge of the proposed attack on the city.

Nicolai also stated that he had received calls from the Bosnian Muslims, respectively, Minister Hasan Muratovic and ABiH Commander Rasim Delic. Both of the latter parties pointed out to him that the population of Srebrenica had to be protected. The impression in The Hague was that Nicolai was operating cautiously. Nicolai nevertheless warned about the prospect of a rapid collapse of the enclave. Van den Breemen also spoke to Van Kappen in New York and to Kolsteren. Via that channel the Defence Crisis Management Centre in The Hague received reports to the effect that Karremans feared that failure on the part of Dutchbat to put up resistance to the Bosnian Serbs could exacerbate Bosnian Muslim irritation; which could result in further Dutch casualties. A fatal example of that was the death of Van Renssen, which quickly assumed an important place in the reporting of the Bosnian Muslims. For example, on 9 July the office of President Izetbegovic issued a statement to the effect that NATO had not reacted to a Dutchbat request for Close Air Support after Van Renssen had been killed by ‘the Serb aggressor’.

The death of rifleman Raviv van Renssen was also a gripping event for The Hague. His body arrived in the Netherlands on 9 July. Minister Voorhoeve called the Bosnian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muhamed Sacirbey, to inform him that Van Renssen had been killed by Muslim soldiers, and to ask him to instruct the ABiH in Srebrenica not to fire on Dutchbat units. Sacirbey said that he had asked Sarajevo to instruct the ABiH not to fire at the Dutch soldiers. Voorhoeve also called Nicolai and stated that, regardless of the consequences, Close Air Support could be deployed against the VRS, as the population was threatened and the UN could not guarantee their safety. It also became clear to Voorhoeve that Karremans was extremely concerned about the VRS rocket launchers stationed north of Potocari. Karremans feared that the VRS would deploy those weapons in the event of their tanks encountering blocking positions in their way. Nicolai did not share that opinion. Nicolai and Karremans could not reach agreement on that matter.[7]

In those troubled days it appeared that the Dutch allies did not wish to leave the Netherlands out in the cold. The American Ambassador in The Hague, Terry Dornbush, called Minister Van Mierlo with the announcement that the United States considered the situation in Srebrenica as extremely serious and that it was prepared to help the Netherlands. Dornbush also called Voorhoeve with the announcement that the United States would give due consideration to any requests from the Netherlands. It was not clear what the proposed aid entailed.[8] Dornbush’s efforts seemed well intentioned; however it was clear that if the Americans were to do something, it could only be from the air, and in the framework of NATO.[9]

The French also enquired via Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Lanxade how Dutchbat could be assisted. Voorhoeve thereupon asked whether the French would be prepared to send in attack helicopters in the case of an emergency. The helicopters made available for the Rapid Reaction Force had not been deployed in Bosnia yet. Lanxade also reported that he had put pressure on Milosevic via Generals Janvier and De Lapresle.[10] Whether any real pressure had indeed been exerted is unknown.

It is also not known whether Milosevic had any knowledge of the continuing Bosnian-Serb offensive that resulted in the occupation of the enclave. After the fall of the enclave, Milosevic made no mention to that effect to the UN envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg – he was too much of a poker player to reveal anything.[11] On the other hand, Milosevic did express himself clearly later, in 1996, when he dropped the question to a group of Bosnian-Serb entrepreneurs as to ‘what idiot’ had made the decision to attack Srebrenica while it hosted international troops when it was obvious that, in any event, the enclave would eventually have been bled dry or become depopulated.[12] It is not clear to what extent that statement had been intended to clear his responsibility for those events.

Orders to B Company to Occupy the Blocking Positions

Nicolai explained the purport of the assignment for the establishment of the blocking positions to Karremans by telephone from Sarajevo and they discussed the problems related to that issue. Nicolai chose to communicate this directly to Karremans instead of via the headquarters of Sector North East in Tuzla.

Nicolai explained that, in addition to the rules for the use of Close Air Support, there was a second problem, namely that Janvier was reluctant to use the toughest means possible immediately after uttering threats of Close Air Support. For that reason it was essential, to eliminate all misunderstanding, and to create a situation that would lead to a confrontation between the Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR troops. The Bosnian Serbs could not be allowed to use the excuse of having been fired upon by Bosnian Muslims. It had to be clear that it was UNPROFOR that was being attacked. This entailed that Dutchbat had to make concessions with regard to their visibility in order to prevent the occurrence of any misunderstandings concerning whom the Bosnian Serbs were dealing with. If and when Dutchbat was required to use their weapons, it would be easier to get permission to use air power.[13]

Karremans claims thereupon to have told Nicolai that, in view of the mandate and the available resources, the establishment of blocking positions was not practicable. The combination of the assignment to establish blocking positions and the promise of Close Air Support did however motivate him to execute the order.[14] Karremens did not ask for any further explanation of the order or Rules of Engagement.[15] Karremans and Franken also did not discuss those issues subsequently.[16]

At 22.00 hours on 9 July, the telephonic directives were followed up by written directives in the form of a fax in Dutch drafted by Lieutenant-Colonel De Ruiter in Sarajevo and signed by Nicolai. The formal order thus originated directly from Sarajevo and not from the headquarters of Sector North East. The text was concise: ‘You are to use all means at your disposal to establish blocking positions to prevent further advances of VRS units in the direction of the town of Srebrenica. You are to do everything in your power to reinforce those positions, including the use of weapons.’ A note added to the order stated that the blocking position had to be recognizable from the ground. As of Monday, 10 July, Karremans could count on all ‘promised supplementary resources’.[17] That referred to Close Air Support.

Meanwhile it had also become clear to Dutchbat that the ‘line in the sand’ was to be taken almost literally. While the ‘warning’ to Mladic did not indicate the precise position of the line in the sand, the location mentioned in the telephone traffic between Sarajevo and Srebrenica was along ‘Horizontal 84’. This referred to a line on the map running approximately one and a half kilometres south of the town of Srebrenica.[18]

Captain Groen, the Commander of B Company, received instructions from Major Franken about the purpose of the blocking positions. Franken also indicated that the orders had come not from the battalion, but from higher authorities, and roughly amounted to the prevention of the occupation of the city by the VRS. Groen was instructed to take into account that this was considered a serious ‘green order’ (as opposed to the usual ‘blue’ UN order).[19] Franken was the first to use the term ‘green order’, a term commonly used in the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff.[20] That resulted in a discussion between Groen and Franken regarding the meaning of the term. The general drift of the discussion was that the order was almost impossible to execute with the means available and that Dutchbat had been sent to Bosnia with an entirely different mission. As the discussion was being conducted via a non-secure radio channel, it was continued by telephone.[21]

Major Franken confirmed the order by fax. The fax indicated that B Company had to set up a defensive position and prevent the penetration of the VRS to the city by all means available. There was thus no misunderstanding concerning the nature of the order. The question was how this could be achieved with the means available. The tone of the order was set with the comment that it was to be taken as a ‘serious green order’. The positions had to be dug in and the blocking position ready by 05.00 hours on 10 July.[22] The receipt of that fax did not result in further consultation.

Groen did not find it realistic to dig in, but an order was an order; which was the reason for the friction that developed during the radio communication. Groen’s side of the argument was as follows; ‘What kind of an order is that – I can’t do anything with that.’[23]

The nature of the terrain did not really permit the unit to dig in, nor were there sufficient time and other resources available. Moreover, Groen had learnt that he would be receiving reinforcements from Potocari to supplement his inadequate contingent of personnel and armoured vehicles (APCs), and that it would arrive at 04.00 hours the following morning. The instructions were summary, and everything had to be arranged as quickly as possible. By September 1995, Groen could not recall whether Dutchbat had been instructed to fire directly at the advancing VRS.[24] Karremans said that he had instructed Groen verbally to fire over the heads of the VRS unless circumstances, such as self-defence, compelled Dutchbat to fire directly at the advancing troops. However, in view of the current circumstances, there had been no time to discuss the directives in any detail. The battalion command had not considered how the existing Rules of Engagement translated into a ‘green order’.[25]

As far as weapons were concerned, the order only stated that the APCs from Potocari had to be provided with four anti-tank weapons each (type AT-4, short range).[26] A number of other anti-tank weapons were also available for the blocking positions and a number of those were taken to the blocking positions.[27] There were however several problems around those anti-tank weapons.

Dutchbat Ammunition for the Blocking Positions

The only weapons capable of having any real effect on advancing VRS tanks were the TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles. Dutchbat had brought TOW and Dragon missile launchers to Bosnia for emergency purposes.[28] Of those, six TOW and eighteen Dragon launchers were in Srebrenica, while the rest were outside the enclave in Simin Han. At the time of the fall of the enclave, however, only three of the TOW missile launchers were still usable. One had been broken and several more lost during the occupation of OP-F and OP-D by the Bosnian Serbs.[29] Both of those weapons systems are wire-operated systems,[30] whereby the operator has to aim at the target through a sight. The TOW has a maximum range of three kilometres, and the Dragon, one kilometre. In addition, Dutchbat had a number of AT-4 anti-tank missiles for use over shorter ranges.

The TOW was the main anti-tank weapon and best suited for use in the terrain around Srebrenica; however it yielded problems from the word go. Already in March 1994, the American Army had advised against the continued use of TOWs of a specific series, as they presented battery problems.[31] The Director of Materiel of the Royal Netherlands Army had banned the use of the TOWs.[32] TOW missiles had been flown in from the Netherlands to replace the TOWs in Dutchbat’s possession. There were 135 missiles.[33] Closure of the enclave had however prevented the exchange.

Dutchbat’s only alternative was to smuggle the TOWs into the enclave in deep-freeze containers, however it is not clear whether that did in fact happen. Both the Netherlands Army Crisis staff and Dutchbat were secretive about this at the time.[34] It appears more likely to have happened at the start of the Dutchbat period than during period of Dutchbat III. Captain W. Melchers, who was responsible for supplies in the first months of Dutchbat III, had not been aware of TOWs reaching the enclave. Considering the size of the boxes in which the TOWs were transported, Karremans too was uncertain as to the possibility of that having happened.[35] The Hague, in any event, was not informed as to the presence of usable missiles in the enclave.

Maintenance of the TOW missiles was also a problem, as they had to be tested every 180 days with a special test instrument.[36] Later that period was stretched to 360 days.[37] The test equipment was not included in Dutchbat’s equipment.[38] Defective TOWs could not be repaired at the Support Command in Lukavac (outside the enclave) once they had left the enclave, as the maintenance group there was not qualified to do so.[39] The Netherlands Army Crisis staff thought that the tests, which had to be performed every 180 days, could simply be performed by the battalion; however, the Director of Materiel of the Royal Netherlands Army stated that this was not possible as it was not a simple test.[40] The Director therefore would not agree to the tests being conducted by Dutchbat or the Support Command.[41] Consequently, if they could only be tested there, the defective TOWs could not be used for more than three months due to the long circulation times between Srebrenica and the Netherlands.[42]

Karremans, who returned in October 1994 from a reconnaissance trip in Srebrenica, reported to the Netherlands Army Crisis staff that there were problems with the TOW control systems, as a result of which not all weapons systems were deployable. He proposed that new control units be sent in with the rotation of Dutchbat III. The Netherlands Army Crisis staff then established via a non-secure phone line that three of the launchers in Srebrenica were deployable and three were not.[43]

A new exchange of TOWs was therefore put on the agenda for March 1995.[44] That turned out to be impossible due to the blockade of the enclave.

After a visit to Srebrenica, the Chief of Defence Staff, Van den Breemen, reported in April 1995 to Minister Voorhoeve that no certainty could be established regarding the use of the TOWs and Dragons.[45] At the same time Karremans let the Netherlands Army Crisis staff know that the usability of his TOW and Dragon missiles was ‘extremely debatable’ due to the absence of the testing equipment. Furthermore, due to poor storage conditions, there was a possibility of moisture defects in the TOWs.[46] The TOW missiles were fitted with an indicator that jumped from green to red to indicate that it was no longer suitable for use. The Dragon had similar problems and lacked aiming devices.[47]

The limited amount and quality of the TOW ammunition was also a point of concern for the Defence Crisis Management Control Centre.[48] The Hague was however incapable of providing a solution. The only development in that respect was that, in May 1995, the ban of the use of the TOW missiles (rejected in April 1994 and still in the enclave) was restated with the addition that the missiles were not to be used under any circumstances.[49] After the fall of the enclave, Franken, during the debriefing, stated in Zagreb that the TOWs had still been 50% reliable.[50] There was no certainty regarding the state of the Dragons. Karremans could not remember.[51]

In retrospect, advanced weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, were in fact more of a hindrance than a help when it was found (due to the closure of the enclave) that the logistical systems needed to guarantee the usability of the weapons could not be put into practise. It was also impossible to maintain or exchange the equipment. Weapons experts advised against the use of the missiles in the strongest possible terms due to the danger of premature detonation and problems related to the directional stability of the missiles.

Ammunition was a general problem. The Netherlands Army Crisis staff was unable to establish the exact supplies available in the enclave. The battalion reports offered little useful information. Relations between the officials in charge in the enclave...