Part III
The fall of Srebrenica

... and those in the Netherlands, namely, Major Franken and Lieutenant Colonel E.G.M. Otterloo of the logistical section of the Netherlands Army Crisis staff, were not optimal. Otterloo had attempted on several occasions to contact Franken by phone to offer his services, but he claimed Franken refused to provide him with useful information. As a result, The Hague did not have a very thorough impression of the types and supplies of ammunition available in the enclave.[1] Dutchbat stated that only 16% of the usual ammunition supplies were available.[2] That number was established during the rotation of Dutchbat II and III in January 1995. It is assumed that the number was a mathematical average of all available types of ammunition.[3] The officer in charge of equipment (Chief G-4) of Sector North East in Tuzla also failed to obtain the data and reported the following: ‘The unit has not been able to give me the figures of the ammo [ammunition] level. Their general answer is that the ammo level is low, but they have enough for self defence.’[4]

The inventory figures for the various types of ammunition was unavailable. The Netherlands Army Crisis staff thought that the percentage must have been somewhere around 54%. The logistical battalion provided those figures in spite of the fact that they were considered incomplete. It is conceivable that the ammunition available to A Company in Simin Han could have made a difference. That company had sufficient ammunition to allow target practise.[5] The Hague also did not know how many of the blocked series of TOWs were still in Srebrenica. A request from The Hague to determine this remained unanswered. When, in May 1995, an warrant officer of the logistical section of the Netherlands Army Crisis staff visited the enclave and could not return, Franken denied permission for further logistical data gathering. This could have had something to do with the fact that a lot of equipment had been lost (for more information on this, see the chapter entitled ‘The departure of Dutchbat from Srebrenica’).[6]

Advanced weaponry also posed a problem for the ABiH, who had some anti-tank weapons, but were unskilled in the use and technology of the weapons. A reasonable number of RPG-7 (short range) anti-tank weapons were available in the enclave. Dutchbat noticed that the ABiH sometimes used RPG-7s, which were designed for ranges of up to three hundred metres, at ranges of up to a thousand metres. According to Company Commander Groen this was partially due to ignorance and partially due to the need to show off their courage, as merely firing the weapons constituted an act of valour.[7]

The ABiH had been in possession of ‘Red Arrow’ anti-tank weapons since 1994. There were two types of Red Arrow; the Red Arrow 8 (from China) and the older Red Arrow 73 (a licensed Soviet AT-3 Sagger). The Red Arrow 8 had superior aiming devices, a greater hit rate and superior penetration capability. Aiming at the target was determined by following the infrared radiation of the missile and wire-guided corrections. The chance of hitting a moving target was slim without training and regular simulator practice. Both weapons weigh more than eleven kilograms, are launched from a tripod-based launching device, and have a maximum range of three thousand metres.[8]

The most recent Red Arrows were smuggled into the enclave in the spring of 1995. No one in the enclave had however been trained in the use of the Red Arrow. The instructions were printed in English and had been translated by two (NB!) UN interpreters by order of Naser Oric. Unfortunately both the original text and the translations were subsequently lost. On 6 July the 28th Division received new instructions for the preparation and use of the Red Arrow via the military communication channels with Tuzla.[9]

The limitations of the 28th Division’s knowledge of the weapon was illustrated when, in May, a missile was assembled and fired off by accident. Three men were injured when the missile was penetrated into in the wall in the location where they were working. Fortunately the explosive charge had not yet been attached to the rocket. On 9 July the ABiH attempted to deploy the missile against one of the tanks that was shelling the city from Pribicevac. The rocket flew high into the air and hit some trees. A second rocket smashed into the ground a few hundred metres away. When loading a third missile, it was discovered that the trigger mechanism had broken down, as a result of which the launching mechanism was no longer usable. Consequently the ABiH branded the Red Arrow unreliable. At that point they still had eleven missiles.[10]

Dutchbat’s Views of the Blocking Positions

After receipt of the order, Captain Groen and his deputy analysed the best ways to execute the order. His deputy, Captain P.J. Hageman, had been assigned by Franken as Commander of the blocking positions. The job was to be done with six APCs and fifty infantrymen. Zagreb on the other hand had assumed that at least 120 soldiers had been available.[11] However, the maximum number of infantry personnel the battalion could scrape together was fifty. Of the remaining 430 Dutchbaters, only about two hundred were infantry - the rest were support or medical personnel. The 200 remaining infantry men were, at that point, manning the OPs.[12]

Groen was concerned that, if Dutchbat sided too openly with the ABiH and fired on the Bosnian Serbs, the VRS would consider Dutchbat an enemy. That would undermine the impartiality of the UN and their principal task, namely, the protection of the population. It was important that the VRS continued to view Dutchbat as a neutral UN unit and not as a combatant. Groen thought that he could achieve that by setting up the blocking positions between the VRS and the population. Groen had previously tried at the OPs to prevent Dutchbat from choosing sides, and wanted to maintain that position in the implementation of the blocking positions. He planned to use this strategy to prevent casualties amongst the population.[13]

The order, as formulated on paper by Major Franken, was therefore not formulated in exactly the same way by Groen in his orders to his own subordinates – and consequently not executed in exactly the same way. The alternative execution therefore appeared to be due as much to poor briefing from higher authorities as it was due to Groen’s own decisions - his plan being to gather as much information as possible. If the blocking positions were to have become location bound in combat with the VRS, the Dutchbaters would have lost sight of the extended terrain. As a result, the lieutenants were not instructed to prevent the advance of the VRS into the city by all means available, as it was as clear to Groen and most of the others concerned that this was not a viable strategy using the blocking positions.[14] Accordingly, Groen’s orders were as follows: Try to determine where the VRS were planning to enter the enclave, where they were heading and along which route. Dutchbat was not supposed to engage in combat with the VRS, as the battalion was insufficiently equipped. Moreover, they could not afford to be pinned down by the VRS.[15]

Groen’s interpretation of the order was therefore to prevent an escalation of the conflict as much as possible and, if possible, to try tode-escalate. Only in the case of a direct attack were they authorised to act in self-defence as deemed necessary. That was in compliance with the prevalent Rules of Engagement, and no one had determined that those rules no longer applied. For a number of days Dutchbat had been under heavy fire, a few OPs had been occupied and a number of personnel had been taken hostage. The situation was threatening to escalate and in Groen’s view the VRS were about to occupy the enclave – unless Close Air Support were deployed. Understandably the whole of Dutchbat was under the impression that Close Air Support was coming. The prevailing view was that there was little else that could save the enclave from VRS occupation. In the absence of Close Air Support, the occupation of the enclave could assume two forms: With a great number of casualties or with (relatively) few casualties. In Groen’s view very little could be done against the VRS offensive with a .50 machine gun (the heaviest weapon) and a number of ineffective anti-tank weapons. Groen could not recall whether there had been any further consultation with the battalion staff on the issue of the Rules of Engagement. Groen drew the conclusion as to the validity of the prevalent rules based on the circumstances and after consultation with his deputy, Hageman.[16] The battalion staff had in fact not expressed any alternative views to Groen at that point.[17]

Groen saw the order to ‘prevent penetration of the VRS to the city’ as an extremely difficult assignment. What were they to do if the VRS were to pay no heed to the blocking positions? The risk was substantial that the situation could escalate if the VRS deployed the heavy equipment positioned around the enclave. It would also result in a high mortality rate amongst the population. The VRS had previously shown themselves undeterred by prospects of attacks on the population. Apart from the unreliability of the anti-tank weapons, Groen, in retrospect, questioned when they could have been deployed and what possible goal might have been achieved thereby. Eliminating a single vehicle would be a temporary success –followed by what?[18] It was by no means certain that the VRS would not fire directly at the blocking positions. Generally speaking, VRS fire on Dutchbat had been intimidating and often struck so close to vehicles and buildings that it was debatable whether they had been intentional misses.[19] In one past instance of potential use of the TOW anti-tank weapons at the OPs, the directive was only to fire those weapons in the case of a direct assault on the OPs. In those instances, the use of the TOW would not only have resulted in an escalation, but would have resembled suicide, as, in that instance, the operator would have had to fire the missile from the exposed vantage point of the OP roof.[20] No mobile systems were available for the heavy TOW launchers. Safe aiming, firing and guidance of those missiles should preferably occur from under armour. Due to the time-consuming reloading procedure, it was further desirable to work in pairs.

Groen thus instructed his personnel at the blocking positions to fire the first rounds over the heads of the VRS. Only in the event of the VRS firing directly at the personnel, or if considered necessary for self-preservation or to enable a retreat were they authorised to fire directly at the VRS - and then only at the discretion of the officer in charge on the spot. Personnel had to await an explicit order to fire anywhere other than over the heads of the VRS.[21] Hageman afterwards said that the order should have entailed direct fire. In consultation with Groen, he came to the conclusion at the time that it was not really practicable. The method should have been, initially, to fire over the VRS heads, but thereafter to fire directly at he advancing forces. Consequently, the soldiers were instructed only to release direct fire in the case of self defence.[22] Captain C.J. Matthijssen also did not instruct his units assigned to the blocking positions to fire directly at the VRS. He also instructed his troops to fire over the VRS heads if necessary.[23] Captain Melchers recalled that Major Franken had in fact determined that already during the O-group.[24]

Because a broken down APC had to be exchanged during the setting up of the blocking positions, Hageman had to return to the compound in Srebrenica and Groen once again discussed the situation there with him. Even then the brief was to prevent an escalation, keep a focus on the VRS to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from advancing around the blocking positions, and to serve as a shield between the population and the VRS. Meanwhile, it transpired that the VRS desisted from firing directly at the blocking positions wherever it was not deemed strictly necessary. From that Groen and Hageman concluded that the VRS would also not fire at the population - as long as the blocking positions remained between the population and the VRS.[25] To the question as to when Dutchbat could relinquish their positions in the blocking positions, Groen and Hageman responded that this could only happen if the ABiH (which was considered unpredictable) gave up the battle, APCs were threatened, or the VRS attempted to bypass the blocking position and no Close Air Support was forthcoming.[26] If Dutchbat were to notice an (impending) attack on the city, B Company would attempt to evacuate the civilians from the city in the direction of Potocari, which was still relatively peaceful.[27]

Although Hageman had been designated commander of the blocking positions, it was Groen who pulled the strings by radio from the compound in Srebrenica. Groen was at all times to be found in the B-Company Ops Room - he led the action from there and coordinated all movements. Groen did not assign a dedicated radio frequency to the blocking positions but used the company network. The aim was to ensure that all reports from the OPs could reach every vehicle. In that way all personnel would remain thoroughly informed at all times - even in the case of interference in the mountainous terrain. Moreover, this enabled Groen to maintain direct communications with all APCs in case Hageman’s signal was lost. It also enabled him to consult the APC commanders directly. Due to the loss of OP-U, OP-S and OP-F, the nachonet would not be overburdened.[28]

Groen viewed Hageman as his eyes in the field and instructed him to reconnoitre and report as much as possible, especially as it was not possible to keep an overview of the terrain from a single vantage point. Groen also remained in constant contact with Franken.[29] Although this gave Groen the feeling that he had not been abandoned by the staff, it was clear that now that things were really heating up there was very little they could actually do for him. He therefore realised that he had to do the job on his own.[30] Franken was in charge of all combat operations related to the blocking positions[31] and he also dealt with the radio communications. Although Karremans was present in the Ops Room, one of the members of the Operations Section was amazed to find the Deputy Battalion Commander leading operations in such a critical situation. As a result, a rumour did the rounds to the effect that it would have been better had the commander been heard on the radio from time to time.[32]